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PANAMA: THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF THE CANAL
AND CANAL ZONE BY TREATY
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 7, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Juan Antonio
Tack, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama, announced a joint statement for
the negotiation of a new Panama Canal treaty.' The United States agreed to
abrogate the Treaty of 19032 and its amendments,' to eliminate the concept
of perpetuity, to fix a termination date for the new treaty, to return the canal
territory to the jurisdiction of Panama, to raise the benefits for Panama and
to grant Panama a role in the administration of the Canal.' In his address made
70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 181 (1974).
Isthmian Canal Convention, Nov. 18, 1903, 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. No. 431.
General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Panama, March 2, 1936, 53 Stat. 1807,
T.S. No. 945; Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation with the Republic of Panama,
Jan. 25, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 2273, T.I.A.S. No. 3297.
Supra note I, at 184. The Principles are:
I. The treaty of 1903 and its amendments will be abrogated by the conclusion of an
entirely new interoceanic canal treaty.
2. The concept of perpetuity will be eliminated. The new treaty concerning the lock
canal shall have a fixed termination date.
3. Termination of United States jurisdiction over Panamanian territory shall take
place promptly in accordance with terms specified in the treaty.
4. The Panamanian territory in which the canal is situated shall be returned to the
jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama. The Republic of Panama, in its capacity as
territorial sovereign, shall grant to the United States of America, for the duration of
the new interoceanic canal treaty and in accordance with what that treaty states, the
right to use the lands, waters and airspace which may be necessary for the operation,
maintenance, protection and defense of the canal and the transit of ships.
5. The Republic of Panama shall have a just and equitable share of the benefits derived
from the operation of the canal in its territory. It is recognized that the geographic
position of its territory constitutes the principal resource of the Republic of Panama.
6. The Republic of Panama shall participate in the administration of the canal, in
accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon in the treaty. The treaty shall also
provide that Panama will assume total responsibility for the operation of the canal upon
the termination of the treaty. The Republic of Panama shall grant to the United States
of America the rights necessary to regulate the transit of ships through the canal and
operate, maintain, protect and defend the canal, and to undertake any other specific
activity related to those ends, as may be agreed upon in the treaty.
7. The Republic of Panama shall participate with the United States of America in the
protection and defense of the canal in accordance with what is agreed upon in the new
treaty.
8. The United States of America and the Republic of Panama, recognizing the impor-
tant services rendered by the interoceanic Panama Canal to international maritime
traffic, and bearing in mind the possibility that the present canal could become inade-
quate for said traffic, shall agree bilaterally on provisions for new projects which will
enlarge canal capacity. Such provisions will be incorporated in the new treaty in accord
with the concepts established in principle 2.
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at the signing of the joint statement, Secretary Kissinger made it clear that the
purpose of the new treaty would be to "restore Panama's territorial sover-
eignty." 5
Prior to the announcement by Secretary Kissinger, U.S. Representative
Daniel J. Flood called any proposed change by treaty in American sovereignty
over the Panama Canal, "an unconstitutional giveaway." ' A year earlier the
committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives,
which oversees the Panama Canal, stated the position of the House that no
treaty could transfer property owned by the United States to Panama without
the approval of the House.7
The conflict is a constitutional controversy of the highest order. The House
relies primarily on Article IV of the United States Constitution. "Congress
shall have power to dispose of . . . the territory or other property belonging
to the United States."' The language seems clear, but the State Department
argues that this is not an exclusive grant of power to dispose of U.S. property
interests? Rather, the executive has concurrent jurisdiction with Congress in
this area.'0 It is argued that the enumeration of the power in Article IV (which
deals with state-federal and state-state relationships) shows the intent of the
framers that such disposal is not to be included among the exclusive powers of
Congress as laid forth in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution."
The interest of the House in the proposed transfer of the Canal and Canal
Zone to Panama is both political and constitutional. The Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee of the House has the duty of insuring "the uninterrupted
and efficient operation of the Panama Canal."'" Some House members feel
that a change in the status of the Canal could lead to a disruption of its
operation resulting in a threat to national security." Perhaps more impor-
id. at 182.
6 The Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1974, at A2, col. 1.
See, H. R. REP. No. 1629, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1973): "In brief, based on our interpretation
of the law, there is no question or equivocation-the authority of the U. S. House of Representa-
tives is required before real and other property paid for from appropriated funds is given up or
conveyed by treaty as the Executive Branch seeks to do in the proposed treaty with Panama."
8 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
' For an excellent treatment of the arguments on both sides see Hannifin, Disposal by Treaty
of U.S. Property in Hearings on Treaties Affecting the Operations of the Panama Canal Before
The Subcomm. on Panama Canal of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 30, at 101 (1972) and Killian, Cession of Realty to Panama; Limitations of
Constitution, Id. at 142. See also S. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT
220 (2d ed. 1916).
M "We believe, however that the consideration favoring the second alternative, for example, that
the legislative and treaty powers are concurrent in this field, are more convincing." Testimony of
Ralph E. Erickson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, in Panama Canal. Panama Canal
Hearings, supra note 9, at 97.
" Panama Canal Hearings, supra note 9.
IS H. R. REP. No. 1629, supra note 7, at 19.
I3 ld. at 20. See generally D. FLOOD, ISTHMIAN CANAL POLICY QUESTIONS, H. R. Doc. No.
474, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 519 (1966).
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tantly the House feels that the proposed transfer would be a serious and direct
threat to the power and authority of the House under the Constitution."
The interest of the State Department, on the other hand, is to be able to
conduct foreign affairs with as little "interference" from the Congress as possi-
ble. Representatives of the Department of State maintain that the President
and the Senate can, by the exercise of the treaty-making power, transfer United
States property interests to Panama." This contention is based on the assertion
that the treaty-making power" is unlimited. Primary reliance is placed on
Askura v. City of Seattle,7 where the Supreme Court said, "The treaty-making
power of the United States is not limited by any express provision of the
Constitution, and, though it does not extend 'so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids,' it does extend to all proper subjects of negotiation be-
tween our government and other nations."'" By this theory a self-executing
treaty could exercise a power vested in Congress. However, treaties must con-
form to the principles of the Constitution." The Supreme Court in Geofroy v.
Riggs" stated the limitations in these terms:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except
by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of
the government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the
government itself and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it
extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in
the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession
of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent.2'
Following this reasoning, a treaty which purported to exercise a power exclu-
sively granted to Congress would require implementing legislation, as is the
case when a treaty requires appropriations. But a constitutional grant of a
power to Congress does not preclude a self-executing treaty from also exercis-
ing that power. 2 For example, Congress has the power to regulate commerce,
" "This duty [to uphold the authority of the Congress] transcends the treaty with Panama, as
important as that is, and goes to the very core of the purpose and power of the House of Represent-
atives." H. R. REP. No. 1629, supra note 7, at 21.
'1 Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Panama Canal, Erickson, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, said, ". . . (lit would be our best judgment that the transfer of property can
be accomplished by the treaty through treaty power." Panama Canal Hearings, supra note 9, at
146. Chairman John M. Murphy said later, "Attorneys from both the State and Justice Depart-
ments were sent here to tell us that the United States can, by treaty, dispose of U.S. property rights
without implementing legislation by the House of Representatives." Id. at 155.
Is U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."
'7 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
tId. at 341.
" Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN REL. LAW § 117 (1965).
o 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
I d. at 267.
2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 141, comment f at 435-36 (1965). L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 149 (1972).
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while concurrently some self-executing treaties deal with foreign trade and
commerce.
23
Both the House and the State Department speak of the Canal and Canal
Zone as "property" owned by the United States .2 However, Panama has long
asserted that the United States does not "own" the Canal or the Zone, but
rather that the presence of the United States in Panama is possible only be-
cause of the Treaty of 1903 and that the United States has no property rights,
only treaty rights.2 5 The controversy is usually couched in terms of sover-
eignty. Very early Panama claimed to be sovereign within the Zone.2 7 Since
the signing of the treaty the United States has also asserted a claim of sover-
eignty. 8 However, the exact nature of the relationship of the Zone to the
United States is unclear. For certain purposes (extradition, tax collection,
narcotics laws) the Zone is treated as if it were a part of the United States,2
but for other purposes (mail, import, citizenship by birth) it is treated as if it
were a foreign nation23 In this Note the Canal and Canal Zone will be consid-
ered "property" owned by the United States.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES
In order to fully understand the nature of the constitutional controversy, a
brief historical overview of U.S./Panamanian treaty relations is necessary.
2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, at 436. Henkin, supra note 22, at 149.
21 Supra note 7 and Panama Canal Hearings, supra note 9.
[1923] 2 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 645 (1938):
It is proper to remark that the zone has not been sold, transferred, or alienated by the
Republic of Panama to the United States in full ownership. The wording of the treaty
is very clear. That which was ceded is the use, occupation, and control of the zone for
the specific needs of the construction, conservation, operation, sanitation, and protection
of the canal. If the canal were abandoned by the United States, the United States would
have no legal grounds for occupying the zone, title to which it has not acquired either
by purchase, transfer, or conquest.
26 See generally Note, Legal Aspects of the Panama Canal Zone-In Perspective, 45 BOSTON
U. L. REV. 64 (1965).
" Letter from Mr. de Obaldia to Mr. Hay, [1904] FOREIGN REL. U.S. 598-99 (1905).
21 See Letter from Mr. Hay to Mr. de Obaldia, [1904] FOREIGN REL. U.S. 613 (1905), and
Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Holland in Hearings on the Treaty of Mutual Under-
standing and Cooperation with the Republic of Panama Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. at 164 (1955).
" Panama is to be treated like an organized territory of the United States for purposes of
extradition. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 390, § 12, 37 Stat. 569. The court in Taylor v. Ins. Co. of
North America, 9 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), took judicial notice of the laws of the Canal
Zone on the ground that it was not a foreign territory. The Zone is included in the term "United
States" under the narcotics laws. 18 U.S.C. § 5 (1970). The Zone is included in the term "posses-
sion of the United States" for purposes of tax collection. 26 U.S.C. § 7651(4) (1970).
1, Children born to aliens in the Zone are aliens, not United States citizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1403
(1970). In applying a mail statute the Court in Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 280 U.S.
173 (1930), treated the Zone like a foreign territory. For import purposes the Zone is treated like
foreign territory. 19 U.S.C. § 126 (1970). The Attorney General has declared the Zone not to be a
possession within the meaning of the Tariff Act of 1909. 27 Op. A-r'y GEN. 594 (1909).
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When the United States first became interested in the possibility of completing
the canal begun by De Lesseps' French canal company, Panama was still part
of Columbia. The United States originally negotiated a treaty with Columbia
* (the Hay-Herran Treaty) for the construction of a canal through the isthmus,3
but the Columbian Senate rejected the Treaty on August 12, 1903.11 Less than
three months later Panama successfully declared its independence from Colum-
bia. 3 This success was due, in no small degree, to the presence of the U.S.S.
Nashville in the harbor of Colon, which prevented 400 Columbian reinforce-
ments from reaching Panama.3 4 The United States recognized Panama's inde-
pendence three days later.3 5
The original Treaty of 1903 was signed for Panama by Frenchman M.
Philippe Bunan-Varilla a scant fifteen days after Panama had declared its
independence from Columbia.36 On December 2, 1903, Panama ratified a
treaty much more favorable to the United States than the one rejected by
Columbia:3 7 "The Republic of Panama further grants to the United States in
perpetuity the use, occupation and control of any other lands and waters out-
side of the Zone . . . necessary convenient for the construction and mainte-
nance of the Canal,' 3 and all the rights, power and authority ". . . which the
United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory
S. .- of the Zone. Additionally, the United States was granted the right to
maintain public order when, in the judgment of the United States, Panama
might be unable to do so.40 In return the United States promised to protect the
independence of Panama,41 to pay any damages caused to private property
owners by the grant,4 and to make annual payments of $250,000.4
Soon after ratification Panama expressed its displeasure with the one-sided
treaty.4 4 Subsequently the United States twice has agreed to amend it. The first
amendment, called the General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the
31 N. PADELFORD, THE PANAMA CANAL IN PEACE AND WAR 21-22 (1942).
32 Telegram from Mr. Beaupr6 to Mr. Hay, [1903] FOREIGN'REL. U.S. 179 (1904).
3 PADELFORD, supra note 31, at 22.
14 R. BAXTER & D. CARROLL, THE PANAMA CANAL 47 (1965).
Telegram from Mr. Hay to Mr. Ehrman, [1903] FOREIGN REL. U.S. 233 (1904).
" PADELFORD, supra note 31, at 22.
3 Compare Isthmian Canal Convention, supra note 2, with the Hay-Herrdn Treaty, reprinted
in D. MINER, THE FIGHT FOR THE PANAMA ROUTE 413-26 (1966).
38 Isthmian Canal Convention, supra note 2, art. II.
3' Id., art. III.
Id., art. VII, para. 3.
41 Id., art. I.
42 Id., art. VI.
13 Id., art. XIV.
" On June 24, 1904, the United States by executive order extended its customs laws to the Canal
Zone and created ports of entry. This interpretation of the treaty was protested immediately by
Panama. Telegram from Mr. Barrett to Mr. Hay, [1904] FOREIGN REL. U.S. 586 (1905). In
August 1904, Panama expressed its opinion that the treaty did not cede territory nor transfer
sovereignty to the United States. Id. at 598-607.
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Republic of Panama, 5 was signed in 1936 and made several substantial
changes. The United States raised the annuity, 4 relinquished the right to inter-
vene in Panama's internal affairs,47 relinquished the right of eminent domain
over Panamanian property," and renounced the grant in perpetuity of the use
and control of property outside the Zone."
In 1955 a second amendment was made, called the Treaty of Mutual Under-
standing and Cooperation with the Republic of PanamaM Again the annuity
was raised,5' and with the approval of Congress the United States further
agreed to transfer $25,000,000 worth of property to Panama free of cost. 2
Although the United States made minor concessions to Panama after 1955, 5
a call for the scrapping of the 1903 treaty by the Panamanian National Assem-
bly, " coupled with anti-American riots erupting in 19645" and the following
break in diplomatic relations" convinced President Johnson that a new treaty
was necessary. 7 Three treaties were proposed; none of which was ratified. One
treaty was to govern the Canal and Canal Zone." This treaty would have
abrogated the 1903, 1936 and 1955 treaties5" and transferred to Panama the
Canal, the Zone and all property located therein on or before December 31,
2009.0 The United States also would have recognized Panama as the sovereign
nation in the Canal Zone." A second treaty concerned the construction of a
new sea-level canal.' The third treaty dealt with the defense of the canal and
any future Canal. 3 The Senate never consented to the treaties, so ratification
was not possible.
Nevertheless, the trend has been toward redefining the U.S./Panamanian
relationship. The announcement by Secretary Kissinger of new negotiations
with Panama marks a renewed effort toward transferring the Canal and Zone
, Treaty of 1936, supra note 3.
Id., art. VII.
Id., art. VI.
48 Id.
" Id., art. II.
so Treaty of 1955, supra note 3.
11 Id., art. I.
52 Id., art. V.
0 In 1960 President Eisenhower issued an executive order requiring the Panamanian flag to be
flown with the American flag in Shaler Triangle in the Canal Zone. 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 558
(1960). In 1963 President Kennedy agreed to have the Panamanian flag flown with the American
flag by civilian authorities in the Zone. 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 171 (1963).
1, The N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1961, at 9, col. 2.
See generally BAXTER & CARROLL, supra note 34, at 3-7.
I ld. at 3.
s 51 DEP'T STATE BULL 887 (1964); 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 5 (1965).
M' 113 CONG. REC. 18942-48 (1967).
15 Id., art. I.
6 Id., art. XXXIX and art. XLI.
I, Id., art. II.
I2 Id. at 19741-46 (1967).
13 Id. at 18120-21 (1967).
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to Panama. The question squarely presented is whether this transfer can be
effectuated by treaty alone or whether it requires the consent of the House of
Representatives. There are precedents of treaties being used to dispose of
United States property, but in each case the House invariably took some action
expressing its consent."4
III. PRECEDENT FOR THE TRANSFER OF U.S. PROPERTY BY TREATY
A. Indian Treaties
Many Indian treaties involved the exchange of land. The Supreme Court in
Worcester v. Georgia" upheld the validity of several treaties" which specified
boundaries for the hunting grounds of the Cherokee Indians." However, it was
not a cession of unquestioned American territory, but rather the settlement of
a boundary dispute. By treaties signed on May 6, 1828,8 and February 14,
1833,69 the United States agreed to guarantee the Cherokee 7,000,000 acres of
land west of Arkansas in exchange for all their land east of the Mississippi. In
1830 Congress passed an act7" entitled, "An Act to provide for an exchange of
lands with the Indians residing in any of the states or territories, and for their
removal west of the river Mississippi," which authorized the President to ex-
64 Although the first principle agreed upon by the United States and Panama calls for the
conclusion of a new treaty, there still exists the possibility that the transfer could be attempted by
executive agreement. See Hannifin, supra note 9. There is precedent for the disposal of United
States property by executive agreement. For example, in 1940 by executive agreement Piesident
Roosevelt exchanged fifty American destroyers for a 99-year lease for bases in various British held
colonies. 3 DEP'T STATE BULL. 201 (1940). But for his authority, he relied on two statutes. Id. at
203-07. The United States frequently transfers property when it abandons foreign military bases.
Generally the agreement establishing the base provides for the disposal of any United States
property. Panama Canal Hearings, supra note 9, at 130. For example, the Dhahran Airfield is to
become the property of Saudi Arabia when the agreement is terminated. Agreement with Saudi
Arabia, June 18, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 1466, T.I.A.S. No. 2290. The Attorney General has expressed
the opinion that the President can transfer proprietary interests in the lands in the Philippines at
his discretion. 41 Op. Arr'y GEN 143 (1953). But, his authority is derived from the Philippine
Independence Act, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 456 (1934) and the Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944, ch. 322,
58 Stat. 625. Property has twice been conveyed to the Philippines by executive agreement. Agree-
ment with the Philippines, December 7, 1959, 10 U.S.T. 2169, T.I.A.S. No. 4388; Agreement with
the Philippines, December 22, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1919, T.I.A.S. No. 5924. To dispose of United
States property abroad the executive usually relies on either the Foreign Excess Property Act, ch.
288, 63 Stat. 397 (1949). "Each executive agency having foreign excess property shall be responsi-
ble for the disposal thereof . , or, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, §
503, 75 Stat. 424.
65 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
6 Treaties with the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18; July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39; June 26, 1794,
7 Stat. 43; Oct. 2, 1798, 7 Stat. 62; Oct. 24, 1804, 7 Stat. 228; Oct. 25, 1805, 7 Stat. 93; Oct. 27,
1805, 7 Stat. 95; Conventions with the Cherokees, March 22, 1816, 7 Stat. 139; Sept. 14, 1816, 7
Stat. 148; July 8, 1817, 7 Stat. 156; Feb. 27, 1819, 7 Stat. 195.
7 See Treaty with the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, art. IV, 7 Stat. 18.
u Treaty with the Cherokees, May 6, 1828, 7 Stat. 311.
66 Treaty with the Cherokees, Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat. 414.
o Act of March 28, 1830, ch. 148, 45 Stat. 411.
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change lands with the Indians." This exchange was implemented by a treaty"
signed December 29, 1835, which by its own terms was made pursuant to the
Act of Congress passed in 1830.11 The validity of this conveyance was upheld
in Holden v. Joy.7 The Court explicitly held that the conveyance was made
through the treaty-making power and not by virtue of authority granted the
President by Congress."5 However, the treaty was not self-executing in that
appropriations were needed and were passed by the Congress.
The Court in Jones v. Meehan 7 sustained a treaty78 which ceded land to the
United States from the Chippewa Indians, but granted homesteads to certain
of the Indians.71 The House appropriated the necessary funds." The Court
viewed the reservation as the equivalent of a grant in fee simple."' Nevertheless,
it was not a grant or cession of U.S. property, but rather a reservation.
It should be noted that in each of the Indian treaties cited, either Congress
approved of the treaty by the appropriate implementing legislation, or the
treaty did not involve unquestioned American property. However, the value of
relying on Indian treaties as precedent for transferring United States property
by treaty may have been diminished somewhat by the Indian Appropriations
Act of 187182 which provided that no Indian tribe was to be regarded as an
independent nation with whom the United States could make a treaty'
B. Treaties with Foreign Nations
There is some precedent for transferring United States property to foreign
1' Id. at 411-12.
72 Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478.
1 Article 3 begins, "The United States also agree that the lands above ceded by the treaty of
Feb. 14, 1833, including the outlet, and those ceded by this treaty shall all be included in one patent
executed to the Cherokee nation of Indians by the President of the United States according to the
provisions of the Act of May 28, 1830." Id. at 480.
7, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211 (1872).
11 Id. at 240-43.
11 An Act making further appropriations for carrying into effect certain Indian treaties, July 2,
1836, ch. 267, 5 Stat. 73.
1 175 U.S. 1 (1899).
fl Treaty with the Chippewa Indians, Oct. 2, 1863, 13 Stat. 667.
T' Id. art. VIII and art. IX.
80 An Act making Appropriations for the Current and Contingent Expenses of the Indian
Department, and for fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with various Indian tribes for the year ending
thirtieth June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and for other Purposes, July 26, 1866, ch. 266,
14 Stat. 255.
11 Supra note 77, at 21:
. .. [Wihen the United States, in a treaty with an Indian tribe, and as part of the
consideration for the cession by the tribe of a tract of country to the United States, make
a reservation to a chief or other member of the tribe of a specified number of sections
of land . . . the reservation, unless accompanied by words limiting its effect, is equiva-
lent to a present grant of a complete title in fee simple ...
' Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544.
0 Id. at 566.
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nations by treaty. In 1819 the United States signed a treaty" with Spain ceding
certain territory west of the Sabine River in exchange for Florida." Congress
subsequently authorized the President to take possession of Florida," and
money was appropriated to execute the treaty. 7 Arguably these acts could be
called implementing legislation. In response to that treaty, Henry Clay intro-
•duced resolutions in the House stating that no treaty purporting to alienate
United States territory would be valid without the concurrence of Congress."
In 1842 the United States signed the Webster-Ashburton Treaty9 which
resolved disputes with Great Britain over the Northeast border." Congress, in
effect, gave its approval to the treaty by appropriating the funds necessary to
compensate Maine and Massachusetts for the territory lost in the exchange and
by providing other requirements called for by the treaty." By the Oregon
Treaty" concluded with Great Britain in 1846, the United States gave up its
claim to the territory north of the forty-ninth parallel. 3 The claim relinquished
was not undisputed American property. In 1843 an act of Congress provided
for the organization and government of the Oregon Territory."
The Alaska Treaty signed in 1903, established an Alaskan Boundary Tri-
bunal to settle certain boundary disputes with Great Britain." Of the four
islands in the dispute, the tribunal awarded two to the United States and two
to Canada. 9 Congress appropriated funds to carry out the treaty in 1903.' The
" Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits with his Catholic Majesty, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat.
252 (1846), T.S. No. 327.
5 Id. art. 3.
" Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 93, 3 Stat. 523.
81 An Act for carrying into execution the treaty between the United States and Spain, concluded
at Washington on the twenty-second day of February, one thousand eight hundred and nineteen,
ch. 39, 3 Stat. 637.
m 6 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS 574, 577 (1820) [1789-1856).
", A Treaty to settle and define the boundaries between the territories of the United States and
the possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America; for the final suppression of the African
slave trade; and for the giving up of criminals from justice, in certain cases, Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat.
572 (1846), T.S. No. 119.
" Id. art. I and art. II.
An Act to provide for carrying into effect the treaty between the United States and Great
Britain, concluded at Washington on the ninth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and
forty-two, ch. 89, 5 Stat. 623.
11 Treaty with Great Britain in Regard to Limits Westward of the Rocky Mountains, June 15,
1846, 9 Stat. 869 (1854), T.S. No. 120.
:3 Id. art. I.
" An Act to establish the Territorial Government of Oregon, Aug. 14, 1848, ch. 177, 9 Stat.
323.
" Convention with Great Britain providing for the settlement of questions between the territory
of Alaska and the British possessions in North America, Jan. 24, 1903, 32 Stat. 1961 (1903), T.S.
No. 419.
* S. BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 427 (5th ed. 1965).
'7 Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1007, 32 Stat. 1083.
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United States and Mexico agreed by treaty"8 in 1933 to exchange parcels of
land in order to rectify boundary irregularities caused by a change in the course
of the Rio Grande." The Congress has, on several occasions, enacted legisla-
tion to meet the financial obligations of the United States under this treaty."*
A similar treaty, the Chamizal Convention,' was entered into with Mexico
in 1963. It provided for the relocation of the Rio Grande' 2 and for the transfer
of lands affected by the relocation.' 3 However, Article 6 specifically provides
that the transfer of property would require implementing legislation.
After this convention has entered into force and the nepessary legislation has
been enacted for carrying it out, the two Governments shall . . . determine
the period of time appropriate for the Government of the United States to
complete the following:
(a) The acquisition, in conformity with its laws, of the lands to be trans-
ferred to Mexico. .... 104
Pursuant to the treaty, Congress in 1964 enacted legislation' 5 which authorized
the Secretary of State, "to acquire by donation purchase, or condemnation, all
lands required for transfer to Mexico as provided in said convention"'," and
"to convey or exchange to Mexico properties acquired."' t
C. Precedent for the Transfer of U.S. Property to Panama after Congres-
sional Approval
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of requiring Congressional approval
before the Canal and the Canal Zone could be ceded to Panama can be made
by reference to the two previous instances when the United States has trans-
ferred property to Panama. In 1942, by executive agreement, the United States
promised to transfer to Panama free of cost the sewers and waterworks system
of Colon and Panama and certain railroad lots.' o However, the agreement
explicitly stated that Congress must give its approval before the transfer could
be made.' Congress authorized the transfer in 1943.""0
,8 Convention with Mexico for the Rectification of the Rio Grande, Feb. 1, 1933, 48 Stat. 1621
(1934), T.S. No. 864.
" Id. art. VII.
See, e.g., Act of April 7, 1934, ch. 104, 48 Stat. 529, 534; Act of June 16, 1937, ch. 359, 50
Stat. 261, 268; Act of April 27, 1938, ch. 180, 52 Stat. 248, 255.
1*1 Convention with the United Mexican States for the Solution of the Problem of the Chamizal,
Aug. 29, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 21, T.I.A.S. No. 5515.
,,2 Id. art. i.
" Id. art. 3 and art. 4.
'I Id. art. 6.
105 Act of April 29, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-300, 78 Stat. 184.
Iu d. § 1, b. (1).
'I Id. § 1, c. (3).
n Twelve Point Agreement of May 18, 1942, 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1289, E.A.S. No. 452.
'" When the authority of the Congress of the United States shall have been obtained
therefor, the Government of the United States will transfer to the Government of the
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In the Treaty of 1955 the United States agreed to convey $24,000,000 worth
of property to Panama, but again, this transfer is explicitly made subject to
the approval of Congress."' Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, which was considering the treaty, a State Department representa-
tive acknowledged that implementing legislation would be required to transfer
lands and improvements to Panama."' Congress subsequently authorized the
transfer."13
Continuing this practice of requesting Congressional approval for transfers
of property to Panama, President Nixon announced on December 23, 1973,
that he intended to submit legislation to the Congress to effect delivery of the
title and jurisdiction over two unused airfields to Panama."'
IV. How COULD THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED TREATY BE
CHALLENGED?
From the foregoing discussion it seems clear that whenever there has been a
treaty purporting to transfer United States property, Congress has given its
approval by appropriating funds called for under the treaty. In the case of
transfers of property to Panama, the executive branch has always looked to
Congress for authorization in addition to a request for appropriations. Al-
though the Congress has generally cooperated in these matters, the announce-
ment by Kissinger denotes a departure from this spirit of cooperation. The
principles he signed contain no provision for requiring House approval before
the transfer becomes effective."' Indeed, Secretary Kissinger was probably
aware of the opposition in the House to such a transfer and consciously sought
to avoid the need for any House approval."' In the month following the signing
by Kissinger of the principles for the negotiation of a new treaty, no fewer than
fifteen resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives supporting
Republic of Panama free of cost all of its rights, title and interest in the system of sewers
and waterworks in the cities of Panama and Col6n.
59 Stat. 1289.
118 Act of May 3, 1943, ch. 92, 57 Stat. 74.
"I The United States of America agrees that, subject to the enactment of legislation by
the Congress, there shall be conveyed to the Republic of Panama free of cost all the
right, title and interest held by the United States of America or its agencies in and to
certain lands and improve-ments ...
Treaty of 1955, supra note 3, at 2278.
"I Hearings on the Treaty of Mutual Understandings and Cooperation with the Republic of
Panama Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., at 60-61 (1955).
3 Act of Aug. 30, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-223, 71 Stat. 509.
" 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 456 (1974).
,,5 Principles, supra note 4.
"' See supra notes 6, 7, 12, 13 and 14 and accompanying text. At the signing of the Principles,
Kissinger made the following remark: "While we have taken a great stride forward, we must still
travel a difficult distance to our goal. There is opposition in both our countries to a reasonable
resolution of our differences. Old slogans are often more comforting than changes that reflect new
realities." 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 182 (1974).
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the continued exercise of American sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Canal
Zone." 7 Additionally, the Subcommittee on the Panama Canal of the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries has stated that it believes that
no such treaty will be signed without providing for the approval of the House."'
Assuming that a treaty transferring the Canal and the Canal Zone is negoti-
ated, consented to by the Senate and ratified by the President, without the
approval of the House, the question necessarily arises as to how the implemen-
tation of such a treaty could be challenged?"'
A. Refusal to Appropriate any Necessary Funds
Perhaps the most powerful tool the House possesses is the power of the
purse. 20 The Treaties of 1903, 1936 and 1955 all obligate the United States to
pay Panama an annual sum.' 2 ' It is not clear whether the annuity will be
continued under the new treaty. If the annuity is continued, even for a limited
time, the House will have to appropriate the funds necessary to make the
annual payments. Whereas, the principles make no mention of the need for any
enabling legislation, 2 2 the fifth principle does specifically provide that Panama
"I H. J. Res. 899, H. Res. 838, H. Res. 840, H. Res. 843, H. Res. 854, H. Res. 860, H. Res.
872, H. Res. 877, H. Res. 883, H. Res. 903, H. Res. 904, H. J. Res. 916, H. Res. 938, H. Res.
948, H. Res. 950, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
M H. R. REP. No. 1629, supra note 7, at 21: "Accordingly, it is the firm conviction of the
Subcommittee that no treaty involving the appropriation of United States monies or the transferral
of territory or other property owned by the United States will be effected without due consideration
of the jurisdiction of the House over these matters."
"I, It should be noted here that another constitutional question raised by the principles signed
by Secretary Kissinger is whether the President and the Senate can abrogate a treaty as called for
in the first principle. The Constitution does not say who has the power to terminate a treaty, but
the question is treated at length in: Riesenfield, The Power of Congress and the President in
International Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 643 (1937);
Nelson, The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States, 42 MINN.
L. REV. 879 (1957-58).
12 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, ci. 1. "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills."
I" The annuity has been raised from $250,000 to $1,930,000. Supra notes 43, 46 and 51.
In A representative of the State Department testified before the House Sub-Committee on Inter-
American Affairs that, "a great deal of enabling legislation will be required from the House [before
the new treaty can be implemented]." Testimony of Robert A. Hurwitch in Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. at 8 (1973). This testimony was given a year before Secretary Kissinger's announcement
and therefore it may not represent the current State Department position. It is not clear whether
the new treaty will require any enabling legislation. There is no mention of such a requirement in
Kissinger's speech or in the Principles. Indeed, given that the State Department maintains that
the transfer can be accomplished without the consent of the House, it is doubtful that the new treaty
will specify the need for any enabling legislation. However, if the treaty does require action by
Congress, the House could refuse to act, but unless the treaty specifically provided otherwise, the
action by the House would not prevent the treaty from taking effect. CRANDALL, supra note 9, at
181; 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1402 (1951); LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 80
(1961).
'2 Principles, supra note 4.
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is to have a fair share of the benefits derived from the operation of the Canal.'2
The House plays a decisive role in determining the distribution of these canal
benefits. In order to fully understand the fiscal operation of the Canal, a brief
discussion of the Canal Zone Code '2 is necessary. The Code was enacted in
1962, and it provided for the reorganization of the Panama Canal enterprise
so that two separate, yet closely related agencies are responsible for the opera-
tion of the Canal and the Canal Zone.
The Canal Zone Government is an independent agency administered by a
Governor of the Canal Zone, who is appointed by the President.2 5 It is charged
with performing the duties of the civil government of the Zone.12 The Panama
Canal Company is a corporate instrumentality of the United States.'2 The
President or his designate is the sole stockholder.'2 The company was created
to operate and maintain the Panama Canal,' and it is to continue to exist until
dissolved by an act of Congress.'10 After recovering all costs for the operation
of the Canal, the company is to use the surplus from tolls collected to pay the
United States Treasury interest on the net direct investment of the Govern-
ment,' to reimburse the Treasury for the annuity payments made to Panama
pursuant to the treaty, and to reimburse the Treasury for the net costs of the
operation of the Canal Zone Government.' Any excess funds remaining after
all the payments have been made are paid over to the Treasury as dividends
and are applied as offsets against directly contributed capital.,,
Prior to 1953 Congress made annual appropriations of $430,000 for Panama
as the annuity required under the Treaty of 1936.'1 In 1953 Congress passed
an act by which the Secretary of the Treasury is directed to automatically make
the payments out of funds not otherwise appropriated. ' After the Treaty of
1955 was ratified, Congress made the same provision for annual payments
which were increased to $1,930,000 under the Treaty. 13 It is clear therefore,
that the Congress has always been cooperative in meeting the obligations of
the United States under the Panama treaties. However, it is possible that
enough House members could be swayed to refuse to appropriate the funds
necessitated by any new treaty (or to repeal the statute providing for automatic
payments to Panama).
,u Canal Zone Code, Pub. L. No. 87-845, 76 A. Stat. 1 (1962).
I d. § 32.
120 id. § 31.
I Id. § 61(a).
2Id. § 62(b).
121 Id. § 61(a).
-- Id. § 61(b).
131 Id. § 62(e).
131 Id. § 62(g)(2).
'3 Id. § 62(0.
114 E.g., Act of July 20, 1949, ch. 354, 63 Stat. 447; Act of July 10, 1952, ch. 651, 66 Stat. 549.
'" Act of August 5, 1953, ch. 328, 67 Stat. 367.
'1' Act of August 4, 1955, ch. 541, 69 Stat. 450.
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There is authority for the proposition that the Congress could refuse to make
such appropriations.' As early as 1796 Congress asserted that it could choose
not to implement a treaty. The Jay Treaty'3 called for the appropriation of
funds.' 39 An appropriations bill was passed,'4 0 but the House also adopted the
Blount Resolution,'' which stated that if a treaty requires the passage of a law,
the House can refuse to act."' On at least one occasion the House has refused
to implement a treaty by not passing the laws necessary to carry the treaty into
effect. The Commercial Convention with Mexico" 3 dealt with the admission
of certain imported articles free of duty' and required the passage of certain
laws.4 5 Congress refused to pass the .necessary legislation., In addition, sec-
tion 597 of the Rules of the House of Representatives states that the Executive
cannot "conclude a treaty affecting the revenue without the assent of the
House.""' 7 The proposed treaty would directly affect the revenue.
If the House were to refuse to meet the treaty obligations of the United
States, what effect would it have on the treaty relationship between the United
States and Panama? One court spoke in these terms:
[The treaty] is not, however, and cannot be the supreme law of the
land, where the concurrence of congress is necessary to give it effect.
Until this power is exercised, as where the appropriation of money is
required, the treaty is not perfect. It is not operative, in the sense of
'3 289 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 152-53
(1953). Contra, HYDE, supra note 122, at 1456.
In Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with His Britannic Majesty, Nov. 19, 1794, 8
Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105.
In Id. art. VI.
"0 Act of May 6, 1796, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 459 [obsolete].
"' 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771-72 (1796) [1789-1824].
1,2 The resolution reads:
Resolved, That, it being declared by the second section of the second article of the
Constitution, that the President shall have power, by and with the advice of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate present concur, the House of Repre-
sentatives do not claim any agency in making Treaties; but, that when a Treaty stipulates
regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitution to the power of Con-
gress, it must depend, for its execution, as to such stipulation, or a law of laws to be
passed by Congress. And it is the Constitutional right and duty of the House of Repre-
sentatives, in all such cases, to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying
such Treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon, as, in their judgment, may be
most conducive to the public good. Resolved, That it is not necessary to the propriety
of any application from this House to the Executive, for information desired by them,
and which may relate to any Constitutional functions of the House, that the purpose
for which such information may be wanted, or to which the same may be applied, should
be stated in the application.
4 Commercial Convention with Mexico, Jan. 20, 1883 [1884] 24 Stat. 975, T.S. No. 223.
'" Id. art. I and art. II.
"' Id. art. IV.
"' CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 193.
1,7 Panama Canal Hearings, supra note 9, at 99.
[VOL. 5: 195
TRANSFER OF PANAMA CANAL
the constitution, as money cannot be appropriated by the treaty-
making power.'
There is authority for the proposition that should the House choose not to
appropriate the necessary funds, that action would have no effect on the valid-
ity of the treaty."' Under general principles of international law the treaty
would be effective to pass title to the Canal and the Canal Zone to Panama,
and the action of the House in refusing to appropriate the necessary funds
would simply be a breach entitling Panama to take one of several courses of
action.' 0
B. Passage of Repealing Legislation
A second, but rather unrealistic, method by which the House could assail a
new treaty would be for the Congress to pass legislation abrogating the treaty.
There are court holdings "' and legislation5 2 supporting the position that Con-
gress can repeal a treaty. This approach is unrealistic, for when two-thirds of
the Senators consent to the treaty, it is not probable that a majority could be
mustered to pass the necessary legislation. It is not evident that such legislation
would have the effect of reviving the Treaty of 1903. Actually, it is doubtful
that the legislation could have an extra-territorial effect.
C. Litigation
A third line of attack by the House might be to argue that since the treaty
was made in direct violation of the Constitution, it is void and the purported
transfer of the Canal and the Canal Zone is ineffective. This argument was
made by Chairman Murphy of the Subcommittee on the Panama Canal: "It
"I Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F. Cas. 344, 345 (No. 14, 251)(C.C. Mich.
1852).
"I HYDE, supra note 122, at 1402. CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 181. LORD McNAIR, supra note
122, at 80.
IS The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a material breach as:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose
of the treaty.
A material breach entitles the other party to suspend or terminate the treaty in whole or in part.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, May 23, 1969
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 893-94. [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
151 The Supreme Court said in the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884): "In short, we
are of opinion that, so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become
the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress
may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal." And later in La Abra Silver Mining Co.
v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 460 (1899) the Court said: ". . . Congress by legislation, and so
far as the people and authorities of the United States are concerned, could abrogate a treaty .. "
See also, Pigeon River Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934); The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1899).
112 Congress by the Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578 (1845), terminated all treaties
heretofore concluded with France.
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is my firm conviction that any purported treaty [conveying property to Pan-
ama] shall be null and void unless it provides for approval by Congress (or at
the very least contains a provision therein that the same shall not be effective
unless and until approval by Congress)."'' 5 This proposition finds support in
at least two Supreme Court decisions. 5 However, the better view is that a
treaty may be declared unconstitutional as a matter of domestic, or internal
law, but still be binding on the United States as an obligation under interna-
tional law, thus the transfer would be effective."5
Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides,
"A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty
has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation
was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental import-
ance.",N
One commentator has stated the proposition this way,
"It seems more reasonable ... to say that in concluding a treaty if one
party produces an instrument 'complete and regular on the face of it,' (to
borrow an expression from another department of law) though in fact constitu-
tionally defective, the other party, if it is ignorant and reasonably ignorant of
the defect, is entitled to assume that the instrument is in order and to hold
the former to the obligations of the treaty."'""
If the negotiators for the United States assure the Panamanians that the prop-
erty can be transferred by treaty (without authorization from the Congress),
the Panamanians could reasonably rely on such assurances. On occasions, the
United States has acknowledged that it has a responsibility to the other con-
tracting country to perform under an unconstitutional treaty.158
It is, of course, possible that a private citizen, a Congressman, or the House
itself might want to pursue the argument in the courts that the Treaty is void
because it is unconstitutional. There is abundant case authority supporting the
contention that only Congress has the power to dispose of the property of the
United States.' The Supreme Court has stated that this grant of power pre-
cludes the exercise of that power by other elements of government:
"3 Panama Canal Hearings, supra note 9, at 2.
I" "It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be
in violation of that instrument." The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1870).
"Indeed a treaty which undertook to take away what the Constitution secured or to enlarge the
Federal jurisdiction would be simply void." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 370 (1901).
155 Bishop, Unconstitutional Treaties, 42 MINN. L. REv. 773 (1957-58).
I" Vienna Convention, supra note 150, at 890.
"57 ARNOLD, TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE 6 (1933), reprinted (in part) in W. BISHOP, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 114 (1971). McNAIR, supra note 122, at 100-01.
10 Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, Comment, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. S'OPP. 666, 1043
(1935).
" "No appropriation of public land can be made for any purpose, but by authority of Con-
gress." United States v. Bank of the Metropolis, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 377, 420 (1841). "Congress has
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[Tihe settled course of legislation, congressional and state, and repeated deci-
sions of this court have gone upon the theory that the power of Congress [to
dispose of United States property] is exclusive and that only through its exer-
cise in some form can rights in lands belonging to the United States be
acquired.6 0
A major problem, however, would be in finding a forum which would enter-
tain such a suit. The validity of the treaty couldnot be tested in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice because only states can be parties in cases before the
Court, " ' and it is unreasonable to believe that the State Department, as repre-
sentative of the United States in these matters, would want to test the validity
of its own treaty.
The prospective litigant could seek relief in a federal district court which,
under the Constitution, has jurisdiction to hear cases arising under treaties.,
The Supreme Court has said, "By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the
same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation."'" It
follows then that a treaty can be declared unconstitutional in the same manner
as a statute. " 4 Although such a pronouncement is theoretically possible, no
treaty has been invalidated by the Supreme Court because it was found to be
beyond the power of the federal government. "'
The Supreme Court has created several obstacles which would impede the
bringing of a suit in which a court is asked to review an action taken by another
branch of the government. In Frothingham v. Mellon " the Court dismissed
the suit on the ground that the plaintiff lacked "standing"'61 to challenge the
the absolute right to prescribe the times, the conditions, and the mode of transferring this property,
or any part of it. and to designate the persons to whom the transfer shall be made." Gibson v.
Chouteaie, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92,99 (1871); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151,167 (1885).
"The Constitution vests in Congress the power to 'dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.' And this
implies an exclusion of all other authority over the property which could interfere with this right
or obstruct its exercise." Wisconsin Cent. R.R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U.S. 496, 504 (1890).
"No grant of United States property may be made except by virtue of Congressional authoriza-
tion.... " Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 1944). "Congress is given
exclusive power by the Constitution to regulate and dispose of property belonging to the United
States [citing cases]. Officers of the Government cannot dispose of Government property unless
authorized to do so by Congress." United States v. Caylor, 159 F. Supp. 410, 413 (E.D. Tenn.
1958). "The power to dispose permanently of the public lands and public property in Puerto Rico
rests in Congress, and in the absence of a statute conferring such power, can not be exercised by
the Executive Department of the Government." 22 OF. ATr'y GEN. 545 (1899).
16 Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 404 (1916).
1" I.C.J. STAT. art. 34, para. 1.
62 U.S. CONsT. art. Ill, § 2, cl. i.
"3 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
I" Supra note 154. See also HENKIN, supra note 22, at 137: "It is now settled, however, that
treaties are subject to the constitutional limitations that apply to all exercises of federal power
principally the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights."
"I HENKIN, supra note 22, at 137.
6 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
' See generally, Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of Standing, 14 STAN. L. REV.
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constitutionality of an appropriation of funds for the reduction of maternal and
infant mortality. The Court articulated the following test to determine stand-
ing:
[The plaintiff] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally.Iu
Frothingham was modified somewhat in Flast v. Cohen"' where the Court
allowed a suit challenging the constitutionality of spending federal funds to
support religious schools. A distinction is made between a case in which the
plaintiff seeks to show that Congress has exceeded "specific constitutional
limitations" and a case in which the plaintiff alleges that "the enactment is
generally beyond the powers delegated the Congress."' 70 In the former case a
plaintiff would have standing; in the later he would not. Following the analysis,
a plaintiff in a suit challenging the constitutionality of a treaty transferring
property would probably not have standing. There is no "specific constitutional
limitation" on the treaty-making power which prohibits a transfer of property.
There is merely a grant of that power to Congress. The plaintiff would also
have a difficult task in meeting the Frothingham requirement that his injury
be direct and not merely a "common suffering" with other taxpayers. A resi-
dent of the Zone could argue that the transfer would infringe on his constitu-
tionally protected right to travel.' 7' Realistically, the success of such an effort
is doubtful.
The other instance in which the Supreme Court has historically refused to
exercise jurisdiction is in cases which dealt with the area labeled "political
question.' 7 2 This doctrine is invoked in cases involving foreign relations law,
that is, "questions of international and domestic law which immediately con-
cern the political or military interactions of the United States with foreign
states." 173 The courts have traditionally been reluctant to enter into the sphere
of foreign affairs.' The most extreme interpretation of that limitation is stated
433 (1962); JAFFE, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1265
(1961), and Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REv. 255 (1961). An interesting sidelight is the case of
Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907) in which a taxpayer sought to prevent, as unconstitutional,
the government from expending funds for the purchase of property for the construction of the
Panama Canal. The court found that the plaintiff had standing to challenge an unlawful disburse-
ment of funds but on the merits found that the government had acted within the limits of the
Constitution.
198 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923).
" 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
170 Id. at 102.
7 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
'" See generally Bean, The Supreme Court and the Political Question: Affirmation or
Abdication?, 71 W. VA. L. REv. 97 (1969); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question:
A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
173 Scharpf, supra note 172, at 596.
... Oetjen v. Ceutral Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918):
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in the majority opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.'
which goes so far as to suggest that the foreign relations power may not be
subject to constitutional limitations because it inheres in "sovereignty."
In Baker v. Carr' the Court enumerated several criteria for determining
whether to apply the "political question" doctrine:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without express-
ing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case . . . there
should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political ques-
tion's presence. 77
A suit challenging the constitutionality of the proposed transfer would argua-
bly be a "political question" under the Baker test. The issue is one committed
to a coordinate political department. For a court to undertake to pass on the
question could be viewed as an expression of lack of respect for the other two
branches of government. A decision adverse to the State Department might
undermine the position of the United States Government when dealing with
other countries in that the other countries would be less willing to rely on
assurances of the State Department that it is acting within its powers.
The issue under discussion here is perhaps most closely analagous to those
cases which sought to challenge the President's power to involve the United
States in the Vietnam War. "' The theory was that because the power to declare
war is granted to Congress under the Constitution, the President could not, on
his own, order American troops into battle. The courts consistently held the
issue to be a "political question" and refused to hear the challenges.,
Even though a plaintiff could show that he had standing and that the issue
was not a "political question," and should the court subsequently hand down
The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitu-
tion to the Executive and Legislative-"the political"-Departments of the Govern-
ment, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is
not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
17- 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
176 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
'7 Id. at 217.
171 Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1966); Velvel
v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969) (lacked standing); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934
(1967). (Stewart and Douglas dissenting); See also Schwartz and McCormack, The Justiciability
of Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 TEx. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
179 Id.
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a favorable decision, it is doubtful that such a decision would have extra-
territorial effect so as to bind Panama. On the other hand, one commentator
has suggested that foreign nations are presumed to know that our Supreme
Court has the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, and that if such a
decision were rendered, the treaty would be "without value.' ' w
V. CONCLUSION
The significance of Kissinger's announcement is not necessarily that it marks
"the advent of a new era in the history of our hemisphere,"'' as he proclaimed.
The treaties proposed under the Johnson Administration would have achieved
much the same results. 2 It is possible that the signing of the principles was no
more than a goodwill gesture made in contemplation of the meeting of the
Foreign Ministers in Mexico City two weeks later,' u and the meeting of the
Organization of American States in Atlanta, Georgia, the next month.', The
announcement was significant because it came on the heels of an extensive
House investigation which concluded that such a treaty, signed without the
approval of the House, would be unconstitutionalu and a threat to the power
of the House.' 8 Secretary Kissinger chose to ignore a very important element
of the American governmental system. By so doing he emphasized the present
decline in the importance of the Congress in the area of foreign affairs.
Even if one accepts the proposition that only the Congress can transfer
United States property under the Constitution, the inevitable conclusion is that
there is no way the House can prevent the President and the Senate from
transferring the Canal and the Canal Zone to Panama once the decision is
made to make such a transfer. The House has a right but no means of enforcing
that right.
Perhaps the most reasonable and effective course for the House to pursue is
to strongly voice its opposition to the proposed treaty by the passage of a joint,
concurrent or simple resolution or through some other legislative means. If the
treaty is nevertheless negotiated, members of the House could lobby with Sena-
tors to prevent the two-thirds majority necessary for consent. In any event it
'80 HYDE, supra note 122, at 1384:
Nevertheless, in negotiating with a State where the final and authoritative decision as
to the constitutionality of a treaty must await the conclusion of the highest domestic
tribunal as is true in the case of the United States, and where that fact must be presumed
to be known to foreign contracting powers, there is brought home to them ample
warning that that tribunal may in fact find occasion to pronounce a consummated treaty
unconstitutional and that if it does, the arrangement must be deemed to be without
value.
" 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 181 (1974).
2 Supra notes 58-63.
1s3 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 182 (1974).
"u Id. at 509.
"a Supra notes 6, 7 and 9.
88 Supra note 14.
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is hoped that the executive branch would not enter into a treaty to which a large
number of Representatives were opposed without submitting the treaty to the
orderly constitutional process.
Michael D. Simpson
